British Infantry prior to D-Day on a training exercise
Introduction
With communications on the tabletop we have so much control over our forces. Perhaps too much, depending on the situation. We are going to look at two relatively modern (for the time) methods of battlefield communication. Firstly radios and secondly a slightly older piece of equipment, the field telephone.
Infantry tactics rely on inter communication between units and particularly (and this is where the wargamer comes in) the higher echelon, be it Platoon Commander, Company Commander or higher. British infantry post D-Day had a theoretical allocation of radios to Platoon level, No.18 sets to Coy level, No.38 sets at platoon but it took most armies that long to get there…. and some didn’t. Why did it take so long. Well quite simply: industrial capacity.
Tanks were not immune to this issue… at least in some armies and in particular the Soviets (but this is covered in a separate article). So her we are going to cover the majority of any army – the Infantry formations (and to an extent Cavalry too).
The problem occurs when you look at the technology available. There were never enough radios, especially when breakages were common often due to man-handling (Operation Market Garden - the Arnhem drop being a tragic example). The company runners were kept busy - and should be factored into games at any level. Remember none of the radios were of much use whilst moving (a radio operator at best would be the target of enemy snipers as would a Platoon or Company Commander in close proximity to him).
Rules should cope with the fact that apart from keeping formation the prime reason for a slow movement rate or reaction time as was the time taken for a runner to get from say Platoon to Company HQ…. and back again with orders. That is not to say that a Platoon would not engage the enemy, be it in defence or attack, but contact with the enemy, ammo states & casualty reports and requests for any new orders all took time.
Higher up (Company and above) radios were often kept either static or in vehicles where practical. There was a distinct difference between communication within the Battalion and external traffic. From Battalion HQ, the Commanding Officer had specific communication to the units in his command, or directly supporting him. All this was handled by men from the Battalion (or attached signallers).
Communication with Brigade and higher formations (including non-integral support – for example air assets or Divisional artillery) was again through Battalion HQ.
Wargaming in general takes little notice of the delays in battle. Armoured units in say the German Army always had radios in the tanks and has armoured command vehicles for the most part (though the early German tank platoons only had a send/receive set in the platoon commanders vehicles, the others were receive only - they upgraded for good reason). This allowed both tactical flexibility and very quick response times. Infantry (and cavalry) units for most if not all of the war moved slower any ways but their response times were also slower, a lot slower.
This to an extent is reflected in movement speeds (or is it?). If we work on the example that:
It should be noted that this is for surfaced-laid wire, for wire deployed sub-surface it would be considerably longer.In certain terrain or in the depths of a Russian winter it would be restricted to surface laying.
Factors that would normally reduce that movement
It is only when a Formation has reached a ‘bound’ or stage in it’s movement orders that there would be a halt – but even this would be brief. So in fairness communication only comes into play during and indeed after engaging the enemy or when the unit had reached either a significant difficulty or its objective.
Radios
Prior to 1944 there would be little to no chance of a mobile Infantry Company moving on foot calling in artillery fire from a higher echelon or supporting units within a turn and quite possibly longer. Even for a Battalion to do so would be unlikely (unless pre-registered fire where pre-defined points (terrain where enemy dispositions were expected) on the map are recorded as targets). If the Battalion assets (usually mortars) had direct Line-of-Sight with the engaged enemy then that is a different story – however under normal circumstances this would be on request from Company Commander concerned (ammunition for the most part would be man-ported and trucks make a noise and are vulnerable targets on the battlefield). Wargame rules should reflect this.
Two other negative factors to consider with radio are firstly the battery (it is heavy, needs replacing and as its power wanes so does your ability to communicate) and secondly radio intercept. This was already at an advanced stage and whilst on the battlefield it might not be too much of an issue if someone was listening in to uncoded messages then they were getting as much information as your Battalion was. They could of course just jam your frequency if they had the power. Codes were therefore used, as was the phonetic alphabet (when communications were not good), frequencies were changed daily and reserve frequencies issued daily as well.
Late in the War Battalions advancing to contact would be more effective (and to be fair the Allies – who had more radios than the Germans at a tactical level - were generally advancing and were at least motorised). Points to remember when solely reliant on radios (and this affects motorised & mechanised infantry, tanks and artillery observers in particular)) is that:
Now we turn to the field telephone. A very flexible piece of equipment which had one major drawback. It needed a wire to connect it with another phone or exchange so was not of great use in a mobile situation (though it was used in both World War I and II). There were probably hundreds of miles of thin communications cable all over Europe by the end of WW2 (though it was, if possible, retrieved).
Both laying & retrieval would normally be as fast as a platoon could move – though in rear areas this would be laid a lot faster by motorised vehicle, especially over significant distances.
The second drawback was enemy artillery fire (and indeed any tracked vehicle crossing it unless buried) which could break the line thus requiring the break to be found and the line, spliced. Checking the line under artillery fire could be detrimental to one’s health. Despite the disadvantages (and there were ways of getting around some of these issues such as creating a network (‘net’) between other Companies as well as Battalion HQ and placing the wire overhead when crossing or near roads and tracks).
A good telephone net was at least as good as a radio network and could then bring both Battalion assets and Divisional support into play. Telephone wire could be laid behind any advancing troops but not so close as the layers' to be in immediate danger of being engaged by the enemy. As a Battalion move forward the wire would be reeled in from the Battalion end.
So to make use of the telephone both ends would have to be stationary. Communications would therefore be setup when the Battalion had completed it’s advance, although should it engage significant enemy forces then an improvised network could be set up quite quick (certainly within say 15 - 20 mins). Whilst obvious the more flexible radio network was preferred (as can be seen by British, German and US attempts to issue radios even down to Section level (for the US) by 1944.
Other forms of Communication
To sum up, to allow a player to reflect the abilities of warfare on foot communications should be reflected in the rules or at least scenarios. A Battalion in Defence has all the advantages whilst it has a good (and buried) telephone network as it can call on all its assets. The same does no apply to one advancing to contact. In any event the following communications should be factored into any wargame:
With communications on the tabletop we have so much control over our forces. Perhaps too much, depending on the situation. We are going to look at two relatively modern (for the time) methods of battlefield communication. Firstly radios and secondly a slightly older piece of equipment, the field telephone.
Infantry tactics rely on inter communication between units and particularly (and this is where the wargamer comes in) the higher echelon, be it Platoon Commander, Company Commander or higher. British infantry post D-Day had a theoretical allocation of radios to Platoon level, No.18 sets to Coy level, No.38 sets at platoon but it took most armies that long to get there…. and some didn’t. Why did it take so long. Well quite simply: industrial capacity.
Tanks were not immune to this issue… at least in some armies and in particular the Soviets (but this is covered in a separate article). So her we are going to cover the majority of any army – the Infantry formations (and to an extent Cavalry too).
The problem occurs when you look at the technology available. There were never enough radios, especially when breakages were common often due to man-handling (Operation Market Garden - the Arnhem drop being a tragic example). The company runners were kept busy - and should be factored into games at any level. Remember none of the radios were of much use whilst moving (a radio operator at best would be the target of enemy snipers as would a Platoon or Company Commander in close proximity to him).
Rules should cope with the fact that apart from keeping formation the prime reason for a slow movement rate or reaction time as was the time taken for a runner to get from say Platoon to Company HQ…. and back again with orders. That is not to say that a Platoon would not engage the enemy, be it in defence or attack, but contact with the enemy, ammo states & casualty reports and requests for any new orders all took time.
Higher up (Company and above) radios were often kept either static or in vehicles where practical. There was a distinct difference between communication within the Battalion and external traffic. From Battalion HQ, the Commanding Officer had specific communication to the units in his command, or directly supporting him. All this was handled by men from the Battalion (or attached signallers).
Communication with Brigade and higher formations (including non-integral support – for example air assets or Divisional artillery) was again through Battalion HQ.
Wargaming in general takes little notice of the delays in battle. Armoured units in say the German Army always had radios in the tanks and has armoured command vehicles for the most part (though the early German tank platoons only had a send/receive set in the platoon commanders vehicles, the others were receive only - they upgraded for good reason). This allowed both tactical flexibility and very quick response times. Infantry (and cavalry) units for most if not all of the war moved slower any ways but their response times were also slower, a lot slower.
This to an extent is reflected in movement speeds (or is it?). If we work on the example that:
- A platoon over open countryside can move a 2 mph
- each wargaming turn is 15 minutes
- each inch on the table equates to 50 yds (45m)
- then it could cover a distance of approximately 850 yards (750m) in one turn
It should be noted that this is for surfaced-laid wire, for wire deployed sub-surface it would be considerably longer.In certain terrain or in the depths of a Russian winter it would be restricted to surface laying.
Factors that would normally reduce that movement
- Engaging the enemy
- Significant terrain & man-made obstacles
- Being part of a Company and/or Battalion and required to keep formation
- Communications
It is only when a Formation has reached a ‘bound’ or stage in it’s movement orders that there would be a halt – but even this would be brief. So in fairness communication only comes into play during and indeed after engaging the enemy or when the unit had reached either a significant difficulty or its objective.
Radios
Prior to 1944 there would be little to no chance of a mobile Infantry Company moving on foot calling in artillery fire from a higher echelon or supporting units within a turn and quite possibly longer. Even for a Battalion to do so would be unlikely (unless pre-registered fire where pre-defined points (terrain where enemy dispositions were expected) on the map are recorded as targets). If the Battalion assets (usually mortars) had direct Line-of-Sight with the engaged enemy then that is a different story – however under normal circumstances this would be on request from Company Commander concerned (ammunition for the most part would be man-ported and trucks make a noise and are vulnerable targets on the battlefield). Wargame rules should reflect this.
Two other negative factors to consider with radio are firstly the battery (it is heavy, needs replacing and as its power wanes so does your ability to communicate) and secondly radio intercept. This was already at an advanced stage and whilst on the battlefield it might not be too much of an issue if someone was listening in to uncoded messages then they were getting as much information as your Battalion was. They could of course just jam your frequency if they had the power. Codes were therefore used, as was the phonetic alphabet (when communications were not good), frequencies were changed daily and reserve frequencies issued daily as well.
Late in the War Battalions advancing to contact would be more effective (and to be fair the Allies – who had more radios than the Germans at a tactical level - were generally advancing and were at least motorised). Points to remember when solely reliant on radios (and this affects motorised & mechanised infantry, tanks and artillery observers in particular)) is that:
- in mountainous terrain all communication is hindered and is sometimes impossible without re-broadcasting stations (a few signallers stuck on top of a peak normally who would have to get there on foot).
- High Frequency (HF) radio communications often fail due to solar activity, sunspot calendar & seasonal factors
- bad radio discipline can create havoc on a Battalion radio net - and can cause more disruption & delay than the word "Tigers!"
- Very High Frequency (VHF) radios are direct Line-of-Sight and intervening terrain reduces their range considerably. These would be limited to late war 'walkie-talkies'. They were initially only used for communication with and between aircraft.
Now we turn to the field telephone. A very flexible piece of equipment which had one major drawback. It needed a wire to connect it with another phone or exchange so was not of great use in a mobile situation (though it was used in both World War I and II). There were probably hundreds of miles of thin communications cable all over Europe by the end of WW2 (though it was, if possible, retrieved).
Both laying & retrieval would normally be as fast as a platoon could move – though in rear areas this would be laid a lot faster by motorised vehicle, especially over significant distances.
The second drawback was enemy artillery fire (and indeed any tracked vehicle crossing it unless buried) which could break the line thus requiring the break to be found and the line, spliced. Checking the line under artillery fire could be detrimental to one’s health. Despite the disadvantages (and there were ways of getting around some of these issues such as creating a network (‘net’) between other Companies as well as Battalion HQ and placing the wire overhead when crossing or near roads and tracks).
A good telephone net was at least as good as a radio network and could then bring both Battalion assets and Divisional support into play. Telephone wire could be laid behind any advancing troops but not so close as the layers' to be in immediate danger of being engaged by the enemy. As a Battalion move forward the wire would be reeled in from the Battalion end.
So to make use of the telephone both ends would have to be stationary. Communications would therefore be setup when the Battalion had completed it’s advance, although should it engage significant enemy forces then an improvised network could be set up quite quick (certainly within say 15 - 20 mins). Whilst obvious the more flexible radio network was preferred (as can be seen by British, German and US attempts to issue radios even down to Section level (for the US) by 1944.
Other forms of Communication
- It should be noted that Platoons also have the use of signal flare pistols and different coloured flares that would signify pre-defined situations, however these were also seen by the enemy, so except when in or about to engage the enemy they were by no means ideal (they were on occasion useful in warding off enemy tanks... but that is another story).
- Transport for runners (jeeps, kubelwagens etc.) could be used but obviously had it’s drawbacks, but often the return justified the risk (especially if they had a radio fitted).
- Both motorised (except when dismounted for an attack – which was often) and mechanised Infantry (who would remain mounted often even in direct assault) would have radios issued to Platoon level at an earlier stage in the war.
- The French infamously used the civilian telephone network in 1940, however the allies used it's own telephone network effectively in 1944-45 as a speedier alternative to wire and telegraph line laying.
To sum up, to allow a player to reflect the abilities of warfare on foot communications should be reflected in the rules or at least scenarios. A Battalion in Defence has all the advantages whilst it has a good (and buried) telephone network as it can call on all its assets. The same does no apply to one advancing to contact. In any event the following communications should be factored into any wargame:
- Artillery
- Operating telephone networks
- Who has working radios
- Signaller casualties
- Terrain
- Distances
- Radio intercept & jamming
- Use of (radio equipped) vehicles to transmit information from the front line
A forward artillery observer team on the Eastern front 1943. Forward Observers had a priority issue on radios to increase the effectiveness of artillery fire & reduce delay.
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German signallers in WW2 with a field radio.
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